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THE ROLE OF LEGAL RHETORIC IN THE
FAILURE OF DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN CHINA
Joseph W. Dellapenna*
If the law allows me to do something, I'll do it.
If it doesn 't allow me to do it, then I'll press for new law.
-- Han Dongfang
Prior to 1989, it was commonly said that the Chinese were
different, that they did not value individuals or human rights in the
way the West did.' Yet, in the Spring of 1989, the world was
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1 RONALD KErTH, CHINA'S STRUGGLE FOR THE RULE OFLAW 54-87 (1994); Hungdah
Chiu, Chinese Attitudes toward International Law of Human Rights in the Post-
Mao Era, in CHINESE POLITICS FROM MAO TO DENG 237 (Victor Falkenheim &
Ilpyong Kim eds. 1989); Roberta Cohen, People's Republic of China: The Human
Rights Exception, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 447 (1987). This remains the official position of
the government of the People's Republic of China. See, e.g., Information Office of
the State Council, A Report Which Distorts Facts and Confuses Right and Wrong,
BEIJING REV., Mar. 13, 1995, at 17; Wu Naitao, Revelation of US Ruse as World
Judge of Human Rights, BEIJING REV., May 1, 1995, at 17; Xiang Xing, Evolution
of Human Rights Issues and Its Essence, FOREIGN BROADCAST INFO. SERV.--CHINA,
no. 90-037-S, Feb. 23, 1990, at 4. There is, on the other hand, growing evidence
of the acceptance of human rights norms outside the Chinese government. See
Beijing Pro-Democrats Form "Peace Charter" Group, FOREIGN BROADCAST INFO.
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mesmerized by televised images of Chinese students, workers, and
finally political cadres demonstrating for democratic reform and a
society governed by the rule of law in the enormous Tiananmen
Square in Beijing in front of the "Forbidden City." The
demonstrations captivated the world's consciousness because, coming
before the rise of non-Communist governments in Poland, Hungary,
and Czechoslovakia, the opening of the Berlin Wall, the fall of
Rumania's Caugesceu, and the ultimate demise of the Communism
even in the Soviet Union, the Chinese demonstrations heralded
changes that have since so unexpectedly amazed us regardless of our
personal political persuasions. To the West, the Chinese
demonstrations seemed to offer so much precisely because they had
no precedent under any Communist regime, yet, the demonstrations
ended disastrously with human beings crushed beneath the treads of
SERVICE, no. 93-219, Nov. 16, 1993, at 24; Dissident [Wei Jingsheng] Writes Letter
to Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, F.B.I.S., 93-244, Dec. 22, 1993, at 14.
Of course, the claim of cultural exemptions from general human rights
norms is not limited to China, as this symposium itself testifies. See also, Reza
Afshari, An Essay on Islamic Cultural Relativism in the Discourse of Human
Rights, 16 HUM. RTs. Q. 235 (1994); Ian Buruma, The Singapore Way, N.Y. REV.
OF BOOKS, Oct. 19, 1995, at 66; Christina M. Cerna, Universality of Human Rights
and Cultural Diversity: Implementation of Human Rights in Different Social-
Cultural Contexts, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 740 (1994); Jill Crystal, The Human Rights
Movement in the Arab World, 16 HUM. RTs. Q. 435 (1994); Jacques Delisle, The
Role of International Law in the Twenty-First Century: Disquiet on the Eastern
Front: Liberal Agendas, Domestic Legal Orders, and the Role of International Law
After the Cold War and Amid Resurgent Cultural Identities, 18 FORDHAM INT'LL.J.
1725 (1995); David F. Forte, Apostasy and Blasphemy in Pakistan, 10 CONN. J.
INT'LL. 27 (1994); Bilihari Kausikan, Asia's Different Standard, 92 FOR. POL'Y 39
(1993); Urfan Khaliq, Beyond the Veil?: An Analysis of the Provisions of the
Women's Convention and the Law as Stipulated in the Shari'ah (sic), 2 BUFF. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1995); Kim Dae Jung, Is Culture Destiny?: The Myth of Asia's Anti-
Democratic Values, 73 FOREIGN. AFF., no. 6, at 189 (Nov.-Dec. 1994); Ann
Elizabeth Mayer, Universal versus Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Clash
with a Construct, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307 (1994); Bassam Tibi, Islamic
Law/Shari'a, Human Rights, Universal Morality and International Relations, 16
HUM. RTs. Q. 277 (1994).
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tanks.2
The quotation that opens this paper is from an interview in
Beijing given to New York Times correspondent Nicholas Kristofff
by the founder and erstwhile leader of a free union of railway
workers.3 Han Dongfang founded his union during the Tiananmen
demonstrations and, like Poland's Lech Walesa, he paid for his
temerity with a term of imprisonment -- both served a little less than
two years. Also like Walesa, Mr. Han is not an educated person, at
least not formally educated. There are differences between the two
men--Han was physically tortured in prison, and the life experiences
of the two men, despite the superficial similarities of living under a
Communist system, could hardly have been more different given the
differing cultural traditions within which they were nurtured. Nor
should one overlook the substantial support given to Walesa by
Western institutions, including American trade unions, in contrast
2 For general accounts of the student demonstrations and the resulting military
crackdown, see AMNESTY INT'L, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: PRELIMINARY
FINDINGS ON KILLINGS OF UNARMED CIVILIANS, ARBITRARY ARRESTS, AND
SUMMARY EXECUTIONS SINCE JUNE 3,1989 (1989); INT'LLEAGUEFOR HUMAN RTs.
& THE AD Hoc STUDY GROUP ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, MASSACRE IN BEUING:
THE EVENTS OF 3-4 JUNE 1989 AND THEIR AFTERMATH (1989); HARRISON
SALISBURY, TIANANMEN (sic) DIARY (1989); THE PRO-DEMOCRACY PROTESTS IN
CHINA: REPORTS FROM THE PROVINCES (Jonathan Unger ed., 1991); Russell
Watson et al., Beiing Bloodbath, NEWSWEEK, June 12, 1989, at 24; Jesse Birnbaum
& Howard Chua-Goan, Despair and Death in a Beijing Square, TIME, June 12,
1989, at 10; Jennifer Morris, Human Rights Violations during the Tiananmen (sic)
Square Massacre and the Precedents Obliging United States Response, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 1375 (1991). Curiously, the death of several hundred students
and their supporters in Tiananmen Square has had a greater impact, both in China
and abroad, than the death of millions during the Great Leap Forward or the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
' Nicholas D. Kristoff, Defiant Chinese Dissident Tells of His Ordeal, N.Y. TIMES,
April 16, 1992, at Al, A6. There is growing evidence of underground trade unions
springing up around China since 1989. See, e.g., John Colmey, Han Dongfang
Labor Situation Profiled, S. CHINA MORNING POST [Hong Kong], Mar. 13, 1994,
Sunday Mag. at 8-12; Unauthorized Trade Unions Emerge in Guangdong, F. B. I.
S., 94-065, Apr. 5, 1994, at 43.
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with the neglect of Han by these same institutions. These differences
perhaps contributed to Mr. Walesa being able to go on to become
President of Poland, while Mr. Han, after his release from prison was
taken into custody and beaten by "court staff."4 Characteristically,
Mr. Han responded by suing the court staff for illegal detention and
assault.' Subsequently, he was "encouraged" to leave China and go
to the United States for medical treatment, and then was not allowed
to reenter China.6
Central to understanding the success of Mr. Walesa and his
counterparts, at least in the European Communist states that had had
a Western cultural tradition before the Communist takeover, was the
society's attitude toward law. Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel, and
Vitautis Landsbergis, for example, were all products of one or another
western culture with a long tradition of respect for law as a restraint
on the state; they set about to revive that still dimly remembered
tradition in order to recreate "civil society" -- a social milieu separate
from and able to oppose the state.7 In China, there is no such
' Charlene Fu, Labour Activist Will Not Be Silenced, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
[Hong Kong], May 22, 1992, at D-5.
5Id.
After his departure, Mr. Han sued to challenge the cancellation of his passport and
therefore of his right to return to China. Court Refuses to Hear Suit by Han
Dongfang, F.B.I.S., 93-206, Oct. 27, 1993, at 12; Dissident Han Dongfang
"Barred"from Flight to Beiing, F.B.I.S., 93-217, at 50 (Nov. 12, 1993); Dissident
Han Dongfeng "Pledges" to Return to China, SUNDAY STANDARD [Hong Kong],
Oct. 31, 1993, at 4; Daniel Kwan, Dissident Han Dongfang to Sue Public Security
Ministry, S. CHINA MORNING POST [Hong Kong], Sept. 30, 1993, at 1.
7 President Havel has eloquently described the revival of this tradition in the former
Czechoslovakia. Vaclav Havel, A Challenge from Citizen Havel, 36 WORLD PRESS
REV. 40 (May 1989); Vaclav Havel, The Future of Central Europe, N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS, Sept. 27, 1990, at 19; Vaclav Havel, A Statement to the Court, N.Y. REV.
OF BOOKS, Apr. 27, 1989, at 41.
On the possibility of the emergence of a "civil society" in the People's
Republic of China, see KEITH, supra note 1, at 88-120; Martin Whyte, Urban
China: A Civil Society in the Making ? in STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA 77 (Arthur
Rosenbaum ed., 1992); Barrett McCormick, Su Shaozhi, & Xiao Xiaoming, The
1989 Democracy Movement: A Review of the Prospects for a Civil Society, 65
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tradition to draw upon. Nothing could be more incredible to a
traditional Chinese -- and the Chinese Communists are very
traditional in their attitudes towards law -- than to see an uneducated
Chinese workman appeal to law as a source of rights, in particular as
a source of rights against the state.
In this paper, I explore the rhetorical appeals to law made by
the students involved in the Tiananmen tragedy. I argue that the
traditional Chinese attitudes towards law and the state of the
octogenarians who then ruled in China disabled them from being able
to understand the appeals of the students in Tiananmen Square.
Those appeals were well tailored to appeal to a Western audience, and
apparently to many audiences in China, but those appeals could not
but be misunderstood by the octogenarians who in the short-run were
the only audience that counted. I also argue that the U.S. press
coverage of the students' demands failed to focus on their call for the
government to make good on its all call for a society "under law."
This failure might well have reduced the effectiveness of any pressure
by the United States government and other Western institutions on
the Chinese government to end the incident in a less tragic way. A
continuing failure to consider the role of the rhetoric of law in
bringing change in China will continue to limit the effectiveness of
efforts by outsiders to influence political and economic reforms in
China.
I. THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF LAW IN CHINA
Except perhaps for the brief "Legalist" experiment in the
Third Century before the common era,8 China has always been a
PAC. AFF. 187 (1992).
8 The "Legalists" were one of several contending schools of political philosophy
in the five centuries before the common era. Their ideas were put into practice by
the short-lived Qin dynasty that first effectively unified China. See generally
William P. Alford, The Inscrutable Occidental? Implications of Roberto Unger's
Use and Abuse of the Chinese Past, 64 TEx. L. REV. 915 (1986).
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nonlegal culture, at least in the sense that we in the West understand
law. Since late of 1978, the Communist government in China has
undertaken to create a comprehensive and effective legal structure in
China, a fascinating process that attempts to bring a fundamental
change in Chinese society in a remarkably short time. An assertion
that China has essentially never been a "legal culture" requires some
explanation both of what I mean when I speak of law as understood
in the West, and of how China was a nonlegal society, before
considering the Chinese government's attempt to remake the culture
and the role that attempt played in the tragedy at Tiananmen.
In describing a system as "legal," I mean that the system
exhibits certain features that we in the West customarily think of as
essential elements of law. These are:9
(1) that controversies are to be decided by the
application of rules or principles established and
reasonably determinable by the public (or at least by
the legal profession) in advance of the events that
gave rise to the controversy;
(2) that such rules or principles can fairly be described
as neutral, not only in the sense of being established
and knowable in advance, but in the stronger sense
that controversies will be decided only according to
established rules and principles;
(3) that these rules or principles are applied by a
formal structure of decision-makers who are drawn
from a profession educated (or trained) in the law and
These characteristics are derived from MAX WEBER, LAW AND ECONOMY IN
SOCIETY (Max Rheinstein trans. 2d ed. 1954). See also REINHARD BENDIX, MAX
WEBER: AN INTELLE TUAL PORTRAIT 385, 468 (2d ed. 1977); PETER STEIN &JOHN
SHAND, LEGAL VALUES IN WESTERN SOCIETY (1974). The Weberian analysis finds
an echo in certain studies by Chinese legal scholars. See, e.g., Ding Xueliang, The
Origin and Conceptual Development of "Modernization" Theory, ZHONGGUO
SHEHui KExUE, Jan. 1988, at 65; Jiang Xun, The Modernization of China's Legal
Culture, 7 FAXUE 12 (1987) (in Chinese).
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committed to the law; and
(4) that the professional decision-makers are to a
significant degree insulated from the pressures of
narrow interest (whether based on political or
financial influence) in their application of the rules or
principles.
In sum, in this context a "legal system" equates law with a
notion of state-centered concepts of "due process" and the "rule of
law" broadly conceived. The Western insistence on these notions
have developed into the concept of individual rights against the
state.10 While these various concepts do not strictly require the now
common notion of "separation of powers," the unification of powers
found in "socialist" states demonstrated the difficulty of obtaining
institutional neutrality in the application of law that seems so central
to law as understood in the West."
Western notions of law ultimately are rooted in a tradition
largely shaped by the compulsive orderliness of the Romans, as
10 See, e.g., HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADmON (1983).
" See, e.g., Chin Kim, The Modern Chinese Legal System, 61 TUL. L. REv. 1413,
1422-26 (1987); Hikota Koguchi, Some Observations on "Judicial Independence"
in Post-Mao China, 3 B.C. 3D WORLD L.J. 195 (1987); Li Buyun, Certain
Questions Concerning the Relationship between Party Policies and State Laws, 3
FAXUE JIKAN 3 (July 1984); Hiroshi Oda, The Procuracy and the Regular Courts
as Enforcers of the Constitutional Rule of Law: The Experience of East Asian
States, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1339, 1354-62 (1987); Note, Concepts of Law in the
Chinese Anti-Crime Campaign, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1890 (1985). An example of a
"legal system" (as defined here) that functions with very little specialization of
function is international law. This feature of international law, more than any other,
leads its critics to question whether it is in fact a "legal system." See, e.g., JOHN
AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE
STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 122-25 (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1955); J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW
OFNATIONS 71-78 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed. 1963); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OFLAW77-96 (1961); HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 265 (4th ed.,
1967); HANS KELSEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY
108-09 (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley Paulson trans., 1992).
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expressed in the Roman Law, that today forms the basis of law in
most of the world.' The resulting notion of a "the rule of law" has
had important rhetorical consequences for Western societies that go
beyond the mere manner in which courts conduct their business. The
rhetoric constitutes the individual in relationship to the state in
fundamentally different ways from what one finds in turning to
traditional Chinese culture. This constitution of the relationship of
the individual and the state entered the cultural memory through its
application by courts to resolve specific controversies, forming a body
of social and legal precedent that shaped personal as well as
institutional expectations. The resulting notion of "due process"
provided rhetorical space for legally-structured demands by citizens
on the government.
None of the foregoing patterns has ever existed in China, apart
from the intrusion of Western ideas in the last century or so. The
traditional patterns of legal thought in China infused the concept of
the "public sphere" with powerful political legitimacy. The process
of legal reform, if carried through on Western lines, would remove
"justice" and the enactment of a "society under law" from the
collective responsibility of the family working through connections
(guanxi) with each other and with the Chinese bureaucracy, replacing
it with collective action of individuals empowered by political rights
working through a legal system.
Anthropologists and sociologists argue for a different notion
of a "legal system,"' 3 but at the expense of obscuring what the
2 Even in the common law countries, which never formally "received" Roman
Law, the basic notion of "the rule of law" can be traced back to Roman Law
influences. See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 10; HERBERT JOLOWICZ, ROMAN
FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN LAW (1978); PETER STEIN, THE CHARACTER AND
INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN CIVIL LAW: HISTORICAL ESSAYS (1988); SIR T.E.
SCRUTTON, THE INFLUENCE OF ROMAN LAW ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND (1885).
13 See, e.g., VILHELM AUBERT, IN SEARCH OF LAW: SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHES
TO LAW (1983); DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW (1976); ROBERT
COT'ERELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (1984); EUGEN EHRLICH,
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OFTHE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (Walter Moll trans. 1962);
ROBERT KIDDER, CONNECTING LAW AND SOCIOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO
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Chinese themselves have struggled over during the past century, and
in a real sense continue to struggle over today. Chinese tradition, the
Legalists aside, knows only a narrow concept of "law" (fa) --
essentially naked power designed to preserve the state.14 Given the
focus on preservation of the state, anyone who ran afoul of the law
was by definition a threat to the state. As a result, the dominant forms
of Chinese tradition recognized only criminal sanctions, 5 and the
criminal sanctions used, even into the twentieth century, were harsh.'6
Finally, law, such as it was, was seen as an order by the state to its
functionaries, and, as such, no business of the persons whose conduct
was to be governed by the rule. Confucius summed the matter up
most pointedly when he wrote:
If the people are guided by laws (fa), and regulated by
punishment, they will try to avoid the punishment but
have no sense of shame; if they are guided by virtue
and regulated by moral propriety (Ii), they will have
the sense of shame and also become good. 7
RESEARCH AND THEORY (1983); VICTOR LI, LAW WITHOUT LAWYERS 1-7 (1978);
LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE: LAW AS CULTURE IN ISLAMIC
SOCIETY (1989).
" See generally HYUNG KIM, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHINA AND THE
WEST (1981); Benjamin Schwartz, On Attitudes towards Law in China, in
GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW AND THE INDIVIDUAL 27-39 (Milton Katz ed., 1957);
Alford, supra note 8. The Legalists' all encompassing concept of law was more
consistent with modem totalitarian concepts of law than with law as understood in
the West. Alford, supra note 8, at 944-48.
15 GEOFFREY MACCORMACK, TRADITIONAL CHINESE PENAL LAW (1990); Clive
Ansley, Chinese Criminal Law under Manchus and Marxists, 20 UNIV. BRIT.
COLUM. L. REV. 165 (1986).
16 MACCORMACK, supra note 15, at 100-33. Death was the most common penalty,
with variations in the nature and duration of execution being the primary techniques
for attuning punishment to the crime; the most severe punishment was the "death
of a thousand cuts."
17 CONFUCIUS, LUNYU [THE ANALECTS], Bk. 2, ch. 3.
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In other words, if people were controlled by formal laws, they would
conform only when they believed they could not avoid punishment,
and they would set their minds to the task of evading the law through
specious arguments and other devices."8 No wonder that Confucius
believed that the role of the judge was not to decide lawsuits but to
"cause lawsuits to cease in the future." 9
A concept of individual rights was utterly alien not only
because of the primacy of the state but also because the system
centered on the concept of collective responsibility -- if any member
of a family was guilty of a crime, the entire family was held
responsible and liable for punishment equal to the actual culprit.20
Nor were there other checks on state power in Chinese traditions, and
there was little developed in the way of a concept of a state role in
civil law.2' If the foregoing were not enough, the emphasis on
torturing witness (including the plaintiff) in order to get at the truth
22
guaranteed that few wholly private disputes came before official
decision-makers. 23 Rather, the state as an institution was popularly
" KEITH, supra note 1, at 43-47; Schwartz, supra note 14.
19 CONFUCIUS, supra note 17, Bk. 12, ch. 13.
20 MACCORMACK, supra note 15, at 119-25. As punishment to the family usually
was reduced if the family helped to apprehend and punish the actual perpetrator, the
family also came to serve as a primary mechanism for enforcing the criminal law
and for representing family members to the mandarin bureaucracy.
2 Id. at 81-82; Jing Junjian, Legislation Related to the Civil Economy in the Qing
Dynasty, in CtVILLAW IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA 42 (Kathryn Bernhardt &
Philip Huang eds. 1994); Hugh Scogin, Jr., Civil "Law" in Traditional China:
History and Theory, in CIVIL LAW IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA, supra, at 13.
See also KEITH, supra note 1, at 40-41, 47; Philip Huang, Codified Law and
Magisterial Adjudication in the Qing, in CIVIL LAW IN QING AND REPUBLICAN
CHINA, supra, at 142; Yu Ronggen, An Outline of China's Ancient Legal Culture,
4 XINAN SHIFAN DAXUE XUEBAO, no. 5, at 7 (1991) (in Chinese).
22 MACCORMACK, supra note 15, at 83-86.
23 For example, the records of one county magistracy in Taiwan province record
only 122 "civil" cases between 1789 and 1895, barely more than one a year. Mark
Allee, Code, Culture, and Custom: Foundations of Civil Case Verdicts in a
Nineteenth-Century County Court, in CIVIL LAW IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA,
supra note 21, at 122, 122-23. See also Philip Huang, Codified Law and
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seen as alien, more or less illegitimate, and best avoided -- a
perspective reinforced by the fact that for 375 of the last 750 years the
government was literally in the hands of foreigners. 24
Furthermore, Chinese culture was without specialized legal
institutions: There was no professional class of experts on law,25 and
no "courts" as such. "Law" (as understood in China) was
administered by and for the mandarin bureaucracy:2 6 They made the
law, the law served their interests, and they often operated
independently from national pronouncements on "law." While the
mandarinate was selected and graded through an open, competitive,
written, national examinations, literally open to anyone, the required
years of educational preparation for the exam in fact precluded most
except the children of mandarins from sitting for the exams.
The form of the examinations for positions in the bureaucracy
only emphasizes the marginality of "law" in traditional Chinese
culture; the examinations were based upon the Confucian classics --
works on ethics and cultivated tastes, not on law. The highest grades
were given to those who could compose the most intriguing poems in
the course of the exam; neither logic, nor geography, nor natural
science were part of the curriculum. Like the emperor himself, these
bureaucrats both made and enforced the rules, without any separation
of power or specialization of function. These bureaucrats, who were
paid almost nothing by the state, functioned in a tradition where
"gifts" (referred to as "going through the backdoor") were an
accepted mode for influencing decision-makers. Economically, a
disinterested or "objective" posture was almost impossible; formally
Magisterial Adjudication in the Qing, in CIVIL LAW IN QING AND REPUBLICAN
CHINA, supra, at 142.
24 The Yuan (Mongol) Dynasty (1260-1368) and the Qing (Manchu) Dynasty
(1644-191 1).
5 MACCORMACK, supra note 15, at 78-81; Melissa Macauley, Civil and Uncivil
Disputes in Southeast Coastal China, 1723-1820, in CIVIL LAW IN QING AND
REPUBLICAN CHINA, supra note 21, at 85.
26 On the Mandarin Bureaucracy see generally, MAX WEBER, THE RELIGION OF
CHINA: CONFUCIANISM AND TAOISM 114-70 (H. Gerth trans., 195 1).
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established, publicly known rules with some measure of neutrality
and uniformity were simply not a significant part of the culture.
As a result, the Chinese have depended on their families to a
degree unknown for millennia in the West.27 In such a family-
centered, non-rule-oriented dispute settlement system, decisions
simply were not made in terms of legal right, consistent result, or
predictable outcome. Rather, decisions were made in terms of what
was best for the social functioning of the group; convenience to the
family (both momentary and on-going convenience) were far more
important than the characteristics of decision-making that in the West
came to be seen as the hallmarks of due process and the rule of law.
In traditional Chinese discourse, decisions were based (in Max
Weber's terms) on an impersonal institutional (and personalized
family) charisma rather than either tradition or law.28 Even today, in
all five "Chinas" (the mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and
Macao), guanxi remains more important even than the backdoor in
obtaining a favorable decision in almost any context.
II. CHINESE LAW IN THE LATE NINETEENTH AND
EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURIES
Modem Western concepts of law were forced upon China in
much the same fashion as the opium trade. When Westerners began
to enter China in large numbers, they became alarmed by what they
perceived as the barbarity of the Chinese legal system. The same
27 From early times the Chinese turned to their families not only to mediate
disputes with other family members, but to serve as go-betweens in settling
disputes with persons outside the family. See generally Stanley Lubman, Mao
and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist China, 55 CAL.
L. REv. 1284 (1967). See also KEITH, supra note 1, at 41-43; Zhang Jifan et al.,
An Outline of China's Ancient Legal Culture, 5 ZHENGFAN LUNTAN 59 (1991)
(in Chinese). Dependence on the family was enhanced by the principle of
collective responsibility. See supra note 20.
28 WEBER, supra note 26, at 228-38.
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treaties (ending the Opium Wars) whereby Chinese ports were opened
for Western trade and the Chinese hinterland was opened to
missionaries also provided that nationals of Western nations (and
later Japan) would not be subject to the jurisdiction of Chinese legal
authorities. Thus, was born the system of capitulations under which
the privileged nations established courts in China for the trial of cases
(civil and criminal) involving their nationals.29
After the failure of the Boxer rebellion in 1900, the Manchus
set about to modernize China by importing Western technologies,
while trying to avoid the importation of Western values. This process
included the importation of Western concepts of law much as any
other western technology.30 In 1902, the imperial examination system
was abolished, a national court system was created, and work began
on a constitution, a criminal code, a civil code, and codes of
procedure. The plan was to create the conditions necessary to justify
an end to the capitulations without compromising the basic structure
of imperial Chinese society. These plans were overtaken by the
Revolution of 1911 that swept the Empire away.
The Republic of China, proclaimed on January 1, 1912,
opened an era of warlordism that prevented any coherent national
government until the late 1920s -- when the Nationalists under Jiang
Jie Shi (Chiang Kai Shek) took control. The Nationalists embarked
upon a more ambitious plan for modernizing the legal structure,
beginning with a constitution adopted in 1929.31 In the 1930s the
Nationalists adopted a modem system of law through the simple
29 Disputes involving two foreigners from different nations could be tried in the
court of either nation. As part of this system, after having relied on "consular
courts" from 1842 to 1900, the U.S. maintained a U.S. District Court for the District
of China in Shanghai and (later) Chongqing (Chungking) from 1906 to 1943, with
appeal to the Ninth Circuit in San Francisco and then to the Supreme Court. Treaty
for Relinquishing of Extraterritorial Rights in China, Jan. 11, 1943, China-U.S., 10
U.N.T.S. 261.
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expedient of translating the German legal codes -- then generally
considered the most modem and "scientific" in the world. The new
legal structure remained largely an exotic import affecting only the
thin new uppercrust of Chinese society.32 The new legal codes simply
did not relate to life as experienced by most Chinese, and the tradition
of the state as alien made few Chinese willing to risk going before
one of the new courts. As the system of capitulations remained, the
new legal system could not even be applied to most foreigners.33
Guanxi and the backdoor remained the primary means by which most
problems were resolved, even among the ruling classes.
The Nationalist government struggled throughout its life for
simple survival; it confronted recalcitrant warlords, civil war with the
Communists, the Japanese invasion, and yet more civil war, until the
government was finally driven from the mainland. The final blow
that utterly discredited the Nationalists was their inability to control
inflation measured in hundreds of percent a month (an inflation often
attributed to the continued prevalence of the backdoor -- which gave
rise to the foreign perception of the Nationalists as hopelessly
corrupt). In such circumstances the government had little real chance
to press for wider application its new legal system, even after the
32 This uppercrust was based either upon military careers obtained through
education in Western-style military academies or upon wealth obtained through
trade with the West; in either case, the people involved were Western educated and
increasingly out of touch with the mass of the Chinese people. See, e.g., Kathryn
Bernhardt, Women and the Law: Divorce in the Republican Period, in CIVIL LAW
IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA, supra note 21, at 187; Alison Conner, Lawyers
and the Legal Profession during the Republican Period, in id., at 215; Madeleine
Zelin, Merchant Dispute Mediation in Twentieth-Century Zugong, Sichuan, in id.,
at 249.
33 German, Austrian, and Hungarian capitulations had been abolished as the result
of World War I; the Soviets had renounced the Czarist capitulations -- this was not
much of a sacrifice, however, as nearly all Russians then living in China were there
because they were anti-Soviet.
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formal abolition of capitulations in 1943.34
IT[. LAW UNDER MAO
When the Communists came to power on the mainland in
1949, they came in with a long-established hostility to "law," rooted
both in Marxist theory and in Chinese tradition. Under Marxist
theory all law was seen as a tool of the former ruling classes destined
to wither away along with the state.3 ' The influence of the Chinese
tradition is best shown by the makeup of the Politburo of the Chinese
Communist Party in 1949 (and ever since): Mao's politburo had only
one member with any legal training, Dong Biwu (who never was a
major player in the politics of the People's Republic of China)?6
The early days of the People's Republic ushered in a
momentous struggle over whether a new model legal system should
34 The Nationalist legal system still survives today on Taiwan, where at last it has
had a chance to take root and begin to reach out into society at large. Still, in a
country of nearly 20,000,000 people, there are less than 1,000 practicing lawyers
(and perhaps 35,000 persons with law degrees). Most Chinese on Taiwan continue
to rely on guanxi, and perhaps the back door, to get things resolved, although
(based on my personal experience living both on Taiwan and on the Mainland) on
Taiwan today the back door is neither so open nor so prominent as it still is on the
mainland. The Nationalist legal system has particularly taken hold in criminal
matters and in international trade. There is even some evidence that it is beginning
to affect the resolution of disputes in large-scale domestic business. Still, the legal
system remains something that ordinary Chinese on Taiwan do not often see as
involving them.
35 ROBERT CONQUEST, JUSTICE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE U.S.S.R. 13 (1968);
JOHN HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAW: A SEARCH FOR THE COMMON CORE
OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE MARXIAN SOCIALIST STATES (1969); MAUREEN
CAIN & ALAN HUNT, MARX AND ENGELS ON LAW (1979); LEGALITY, IDEOLOGY,
AND THE STATE (David Sugarman ed. 1983); E.B. PASHUKANIs, LAW AND
MARXISM: A GENERAL THEORY (Barbara Einhorn trans. 1983).
36 SHAO-CHUN LENG & HUNGDAH CHIU, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN POST-MAO CHINA
11 (1985). In contrast, Lenin's Politburo in 1917 contained a majority who had
been educated as lawyers (including Lenin himself), and several influential
members--particularly Krylenko--had practiced law.
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even be created. 37 The new government's first decree abolished all
existing laws."8 Thereafter, those who wanted to follow the Soviet
road to socialism favored enactment of a new code system copied
from the Soviets, and the creation of a professional lawyer class
trained in this system. Those who stressed "socialism with Chinese
characteristics" denied the relevance of "law" to China, and fostered
repeated efforts to "abolish law" whenever it reappeared. 39 A revival
of law in 1951, with the creation of a legal profession and the
adoption of a number of important statutes, was cut short with
campaigns against "reactionaries," "bad elements," and "class
enemies" in 1952 and 1953.40 The Constitution of 1954 signaled the
apparent triumph of the pro-law group, culminating in Chairman
Mao's announcement of the "100 Flowers" campaign of 1956 to
encourage the development of regular procedures and freedom of
thought.4' Again formal courts were reestablished, law schools were
reopened, and statutes were proposed or adopted. 42  The "100
Flowers" movement was cut short late in 1957 when Chairman Mao
found that he had enough of divergent ideas.43 With the advent of the
"Great Leap Forward" in 1958, "law" was again abolished.
44
The dismal failure of the "Great Leap Forward" temporarily
discredited Mao, and permitted the pro-law group to take control in
37 See generally LI, supra note 13; LENG & CHIU, supra note 36, at 7-27.
38 Leng & Chiu, supra note 36, at 1I. In contrast, Lenin's first decree was to
continue in effect all laws of the prior regimes until replaced by the actions of the
new government.
39 Mao Ze Dong (Mao Tse Tung), On the Correct Handling of Contradictions
among the People, in SELECTED READINGS FROM THE WORKS OF MAO TSE TUNG
449-50 (official trans. 1971).
40 LENG & CHIU, supra note 36, at 1 I-13.
41 See generally I RODERICK MACFARQUHAR, THE ORIGINS OF THE CULTURAL
REVOLUTION 15-85 (1974); Franz Michael, Ideology, Reality, and Human Rights,
in HUMAN RIGHTS INTHEPEOPLE'S REPUBLICOFCCHINA 102, 106-11 (Franz Michael
& Yuan-Li Wu eds., 1988).
42 LENG & CHIU, supra note 36, at 13-16.
43 I MACFARQUHAR, sulpra note 41, at 86-310.
44 LENG & CHIU, stpra note 36, at 16-17.
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1960 under the leadership of President Liu Shao Chi and the party's
new General Secretary, Deng Xiaoping.4 5 Formal courts were
reestablished, additional statutes were prepared, the law schools were
reopened, and China seemed to settle into a course of orderly socialist
development. This was cut off when Mao, backed by the People's
Liberation Army, turned to the adolescents of China to overthrow the
Communist Party in the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" of
1966.46 All schools in China were closed, the regular courts were
abolished, law-trained persons were sent out to work cleaning latrines
on collective farms (if they were not imprisoned or killed outright),
and millions were killed (and millions more imprisoned) without
anything like a trial.47
IV. THE RECENT REFORMS
48
The reopening of the lower schools in 1972 and of the
universities in 1976 did not include the reopening of the law schools.
Nor did the re-establishment of regular courts in 1974 include the re-
introduction of a professional class of lawyers. Even today,
professional judges are generally not educated in law. Only with the
second rehabilitation of Deng Xiao Ping in 1976, and the fall of the
Gang of Four, could thought be given to recreating a true legal
system.49  The Communist Party Central Committee voted in
November 1978, that the class struggle had ended in China, and that
the time had come to create a legal structure to normalize life in
45 Id. at 17.
46 Id. at 17-20.
47 Id. at 20-28; BRADY, supra note 30, at 168-203; Michael, supra note 36, at
113-16.
48 See generally Jianfan Wu, Building New China's Legal System, 22 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'LL. 1 (1983).
49 DAVID BONAVIA, VERDICr IN PEKING: THE TRIAL OF THE GANG OF FOUR (1984).
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China." Deng's government had two motives for this decision to
recreate a legal structure: to reenter the international market; and to
make a second cultural revolution impossible.5' There followed key
decisions to modernize China by importing Western technology, to
foster individual incentive as a means of promoting economic
growth,52 and to introduce rule by law, not the rule of law.53
One should note that Deng's justifications for the introduction
of a modem, Western-style legal system were largely, but not entirely,
economic in nature: 4 The student's demands for a turn to a society
"under law" in the Tiananmen incident were therefore alien and
threatening to those octogenarian rulers who saw the legal reforms in
purely economic terms, and scarcely less so for those who sought to
create institutional barriers to future attempts to overthrow the state
or the Party. Few, if any, of the Chinese leaders saw the legal reforms
as a renegotiation of the social contract between the state and its
citizens.
Unlike other socialist countries that had had highly developed
pre-revolutionary legal traditions, the Communists in China did not
lead off with a new set of comprehensive codes, or (after 1978) even
50 Gary Vause & Georgia Vrionis, China's Labor Law Reform Challenge:
Motivation of the Productive Forces, 24 STAN. J. INT'L L. 447, 451-57 (1988).
SI See Deng Xiao Ping, Reform of System of Party, State Leadership, CHINA
DAILY, July 1, 1987, at 4, (English translation of a speech given in 1980 to the
Politbureau of the Communist Party of China). See generally Keith, supra note 1.
52 See generally JAMES ETHERIDGE, CHINA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (1990);
KEITH, supra note I, at 121-42; BENEDICT STAVIS. CHINA'S POLITICAL REFORM
(1988); JOHN WOODRUFF, CHINA IN SEARCH OF ITS FUTURE (1989). As a result of
the disjointed earlier attempts to create law in Communist China, there already were
a large number of uncodified statutes, limited preliminary work on comprehensive
codes, and an elaborate, if infrequently used, court system.
53 See Charles Burton, Political and Social Change in China since 1978, 31 (1990);
KEITH, supra note 1, at i, 8-27; and Richard Baum, "Modernization" and Legal
Reforn in Post-Mao China: The Rebirth of Socialist Legality, 19 STUD. IN COMP.
COMMUNISM no. 2, at 70 (Summer 1986).
14 ORVILLE SCHELL, To GET RICH Is GLORIOUS: CHINA IN THE EIGHTIES (1984).
See also Alison Conner, To Get Rich Is Precarious: Regulation of Private
Enterprise in the People ' Republic of Chiha, 5 J. CHINESE L. I (1991).
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with national statutes; nor did the government simply set about to
import an entire legal system as the Nationalists had done. Instead,
the government undertook a lengthy process of study and debate
before adopting new statutes that presumably are well adapted to
Chinese traditions and needs. Therefore, a pattern emerged under
which legal reform would be realized first through a regulations
promulgated by one or more provincial or local governments, after
which the national government would publish a draft law.
Eventually, often after a process of national discussion lasting as
much as a decade, the national government would adopt a new
national law on a particular topic and then undertake to educate the
government, the Party, and the citizenry about the new law."
The government can point to significant accomplishments in
its drive to legalize the culture, but it is far too early to tell if the
process will succeed.56 One of the most striking aspects of this
process is that even after a new national law is adopted, it might not
be followed in some parts of the country even without any formal
dispensation for such deviance from national norms. Guanxi, the
back door, nearly a century without effective national government and
wide-spread opposition to the direction reforms have taken, continue
to take their toll in blocking the national government's attempts to
impose a modern legal system on what remains an essentially
nonlegal culture.57 Further complicating this picture is the continued
practice of'judges deferring to party policy, often as articulated behind
closed doors by the court's party secretary, over formal laws. 8
55 For the popular educational programs, see KEITH, supra note I, at 19-27.
56 LI, supra note 13, at 128-3 1.
57 On the continued importance of guanxi and of other traditional features of
Chinese life in place of reliance on formal law, see generally Fox BUTTERFIELD,
CHINA: ALIVE IN A BITTER SEA (1982); NICHOLAS D. KRISTOFF & SHERYL WU-
DUNN, CHINA WAKES: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF A RISING POWER (1994).
58 Li, supra note 11. A good example is the Marriage Law of 1980 which, while
extremely liberal in form, has been applied very conservatively--in fact, no divorce
is granted without the consent of the "work units" of both spouses although the
family law does not require this. See Alisa Burns, Family Policies il China, I
AusTL. J.L. & Soc'Y, 80, 84-90 (1983).
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Governmental control over formal rights is written into all of
the most important legal texts. The 1982 Constitution recognizes the
full panoply of civil rights that one would expect in a modem society,
but always explicitly subject to "regulation by law., 59 This should not
be surprising as Chinese legal theory justifies civil rights only as an
aid to the state, and not as a protection against the state.60 For
example, freedom of speech is justified as an aid for providing
information and advice to the state, not as a value that is largely
independent of the state apparatus. 61 That understanding was clearly
expressed in the current version of the Constitution of the People's
Republic of China. The first paragraph of Article 41 of the
Constitution provides:
Citizens of the People's Republic of China have the
right to criticize and make suggestions regarding any
state organ or functionary. Citizens have the right to
make to relevant state organs complaints or charges
against, or exposures of, any state organ or
functionary for violation of the law or dereliction of
duty; but fabrication of distortion of facts for purposes
59 See CONST. OFTHEPEOPLE'S REP. OFCHINA [1982], arts. 33-51 ("1982 CONST.").
The official translation is found in 1 LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REP. OF CHINA (1979-
1982) 1, 12-14 (1987). See generally Hungdah Chiu, The 1982 Chinese
Constitution and the Rule of Law, 11 REv. OF SOCIALIST L. 143 (1985); R. Randle
Edwards, Civil and Social Rights: Theory and Practice in Chinese Law Today, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 52 (R. Randle Edwards et al. eds.,
1986); Mark Findley & Thomas Chiu, Constitutional Rights and the Constraint of
Popular Dissent: Recent Resort to Legalism in China, 19 INT'L J. Soc. L. 67
(1991); and Andrew Nathan, Political Rights in Chinese Constitutions, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA, supra note 59, at 77, 110, 12-24.
60 Louis Henkin, The Human Rights Idea in Contemporary China: A Comparative
Perspective, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA, supra note 59, at 7, 27.
61 Nathan, supra note 59, at 77, 110, 12-24. See generally, Andrew Nathan,
Sources of Chinese Rights Thinking, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA,
supra note 59, at 125.
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of libel or false incrimination is prohibited.62
The provision guaranteeing freedom of speech is more
categorical, and hence more similar to our own: "Citizens of the
People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of
assembly, of association, or procession and of demonstration."'63 Yet
this in turn is qualified, as are all rights under the Constitution of the
People's Republic of China, by Article 51 of the Constitution which
states "Citizens of the People's Republic of China, in exercising their
freedoms and rights, may not infringe upon the interests of the state,
of society, of the collective, or upon the lawful freedoms and rights
of other citizens." ' 4 The octogenarians, from whom the students
demanded a "nation under law," saw that concept as less than
autonomous, always subject to arbitrary application in the state's
interests, meaning the Party's interests, meaning the octogenarians
interests.65
As already noted, even when reform statutes were adopted, the
government's aims were more economic than political. The National
Peoples' Congress has adopted a long list of statutes since 1978.
Most have related to sweeping economic reforms designed to create
certainty about the safety of person and property necessary both to
attract foreign investment and to unleash the productive capacities of
the Chinese masses. Finally, in contrast with the rather sweeping
substantive legal reforms attempted in China over the last decade,
there have been rather few structural reforms. Perhaps, this
62 1982 CONST., supra note 59, art. 41.
63 Id., art. 35.
64 Id., art. 51. The effect of this qualification is examined in Owen Fiss, Two
Constitutions, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 492 (1986). The point of fundamental
philosophical difference is largely overlooked in Hilary Josephs, The Chinese
Democracy Movement in U.S. Perspective, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 285 (1992).
65 For a graphic illustration of the resulting puzzlement, see Guo Zu, Why Those
Who Study Law Act Against the Law--Meditation by Teachers and Students of the
China Politics and Law University, RENMIN RmAo [PEOPLE'S DAL--Beijing], Oct.
23, 1989, at4.
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represents the small number of lawyers available to create or
implement new structures. As a result, most judges and prosecutors
still have no formal legal training.
There are today about 50,000 lawyers in China, with another
15,000 law students in the wings -- for a population of more than
1,000,000,000. Most of these lawyers work in government law
offices, in roles analogous to public defenders and legal aid. A
comparable situation for the United States would be if General
Motors Corporation had to rely on legal aid. In all of China there are
still only a few "cooperative" (private) law firms, beginning with one
founded in Shanghai in 1988 by five attorneys, and even the
cooperative firms are under a statutory duty to put the interests of the
state first.
66
V. THE RHETORIC OF TIANANMEN
The Chinese government after 1978 not only promulgated
many new laws, it also set about to spread popular knowledge of
those laws among the people. Many articles and speeches by party
and government leaders called on the party and the state to obey the
law67- - a seldom unheard demand in Chinese history. In no small
measure, the demands of the students and of their many supporters in
the population at large during the Tiananmen demonstrations boiled
down to a demand that the government and the Party actually do what
66 Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Lawyers, art. 1
(1980); Frankie Leung, The Re-Emergence of the Legal Profession in the People's
Republic of China, 6 N. Y. L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 275 (1987); Henry Pitney,
The Role of Legal Practitioners in the People's Republic of China, 24 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 323 (1988). Despite this duty, state-owned Chinese enterprises are on waiting
lists for such law firms: Chinese managers, even in state-owned enterprises,
understand the concept of conflict of interest (which seems more pointed when the
lawyer is an employee of the state) as easily as we do.
67 See, e.g., Zhao Ziyang, Advance along the Road of Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics, in DOCUMENTS OF THE THIRTEENTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA 42-60 (1987).
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they were educating the people to expect.68 In the most central
documents of the protests,69 the students clearly articulated precisely
this demand. While this demand was the core of the student demands
for reform, it was largely ignored in the press coverage in the United
States as well as misunderstood by China's ruling octogenarians who
responded with force rather than reform.
First, consider the declaration adopted by the Provisional
Students' Federation of the Capital Universities and Colleges at a
meeting held at People's University on April 26, 1989. That
declaration included a list of thirteen slogans that was to serve as their
program, beginning with the following items:
70
1. Support the Communist Party and socialism!
Support Reform!
2. Long live democracy!
3. Oppose corruption in government; oppose special
privileges! [and]
4. Pledge to defend the Constitution to the death!
Other significant pieces of student discourse or their
supporting groups also failed to get specific attention in the U.S.
press. On April 21, 1989, a petition by forty-seven scholars
requesting the government to support the students' Democracy
Movement appeared, and the Beijing newspaper, Technology Daily,
provided extensive descriptions of student committees seeking
specific commitments to legal reform from the government. These
publications were denounced in the Peoples 'Daily (the official organ
68 See also James Caldwell, Toward Democracy and Law in the People's Republic
of China, 1987-1988, in MAINLAND CHINA AFIER THE THIRTEENTH PARTY
CONGRESS 66-86 (King-Yuh Chang ed., 1990).
69 For collections of such documents, see VOICES FROM TIANANMEN SQUARE (Mok
Chiu Yu & J. Frank Harrison eds., 1990); CRIES FOR DEMOCRACY (Han Minzhu &
Hua Sheng eds., 1990). See also CHU-YUAN CHENG, BEHIND THE TIANANMEN
MASSACRE: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC FERMENT IN CHINA (1990).
70 Reprinted in CRIES FOR DEMOCRACY, supra note 69, at 72-73.
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of the Chinese Communist Party) as planned conspiracies intended to
induce riots7 and rumors began to circulate about secret arrests.
These developments gave power to demands for the protection of
individual rights and due process. The press in the United States
translated these critical specifics into vague editorials about freedom
and democracy, thereby diluting the power of the actual demands of
the demonstrators.72
The demand for the rule of law cast the 1989 demonstrations
in a different posture than either the enormous demonstrations by the
Red Guards in Tiananmen Square in the 1960s or the anti-
government riots in Tiananmen in 1976. Yet, the call for the
government to honor its promise of a nation "under law" was largely
lost on the western press. The New York Times referred to this
student movement as a "march for democracy" and reported that the
students had only three demands: An official reappraisal of the late
Hu Yaobang, an apology from the government for "unspecified
mistakes," and the collective resignation of the octogenarians.
Curiously, none of these specific demands appear in the
Chinese publications referred to here. Daniel Southerland, in the
Washington Post, discussed the tradition of student protest in China,
concluding that the then current demonstrations were demanding
"democratic changes," including freedom of the press, the right to
assemble, and the disclosure of public leaders' finances.74 The Los
Angeles Times, in an in-depth analysis of the political situation in
China, actually sought to refute the argument that Hu Yaobang was
71 Excerpted in id., at 83-85.
72 VOICES FROM TIANANMEN SQUARE, supra note 69.
73 Nicholas D. Kristoff, Chinese Students March for Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
18, 1989, atA3.
74 Daniel Southerland, 150,000 Chinese March to Demand Democracy: Student
Sit-In Defies Ban on Protest, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1989, at Al; Daniel
Southerland, China Talks Called Ruse By Students, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1989, at
Al.
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a democratic leader while emphasizing the demands for a free press.75
Although the Los Angeles Times, a short time later, drew an analogy
between the then current student demonstrations and those of 1919,
once again the paper did not discuss the significance of reforms tied
to demands for the government to make good on its promise to create
a nation under law.76
As matters spiraled toward their unfortunate denouement, the
students began a hunger strike. They explained their actions with a
long manifesto that included the following passages:
For thousands of years, Chinese society has followed
a vicious cycle of overthrowing an old emperor just to
put up a new one. History has shown that the fall of
a leader who has lost the people's support cannot
solve China's essential political problem. What we
need is not a perfect savior, but a sound democratic
system. We thus call for the following: (1) all
[sectors of society] should establish lawful,
autonomous citizens' organizations, and gradually
develop these organizations into citizens' political
forces that will act to check government policy
making, for the quintessence of democracy is the
curbing and balancing of power. We would rather
have ten monsters that are mutually restrained than
one angel of absolute power; (2) by impeaching
leaders who have committed serious errors, [we
should] gradually establish a sound system for the
impeachment of officials. Whoever rises and
whoever falls is not important; what is important is
how one ascends to, or falls from, power. An
75 Edward A.Gargan, Searching for a Champion, China's Students Happen on an
Unlikely Hero, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1989, at V-2.
76 Merle Goldman, In the May 4th Tradition, Chinese Students Seek a New
Turning Point, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 1989, at 1-7.
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undemocratic procedure of appointment and dismissal
can only result in dictatorship ....
Actions such as demonstrations and hunger
strikes are democratic ways through which people
express their wishes; they are completely legal and
reasonable. They are anything but "turmoil." Yet the
government ignored the basic rights of the people
granted by the Constitution; on the basis of its
autocratic political ideology, it labeled the student
movement as "turmoil."... The government should
draw some painful lessons from this major movement.
It should learn to become accustomed to listening to
the voice of the people, to allowing people to express
their desires through the exercise of the
constitutionally granted rights, and to governing the
country in a democratic way. This nationwide
movement for democracy is a lesson for the
government in how to govern society by means of
democracy and the rule of law.77
I have quoted at such length from the hunger strike manifesto
because it is such an undeniably clear demand for the political power
of citizens to be guaranteed under a system of law built around
separation of powers and due process, just as the rhetoric of the
octogenarian rulers had led many in China to expect. Foreign
commentators have tended to miss this element in the students'
demands, emphasizing the calls for democracy and an end to
corruption without focusing on how the students proposed to have
their government bring these goals into being.78 Perhaps our
77 CRIES FOR DEMOCRACY, supra note 69, at 349-54.
78 See, e.g., EDWARD A. GARGAN, CHINA'S FATE 249-332 (1991); ANDREW J.
NATHAN, CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY
171-92 (1990); and Edward Friedman, Permanent Technological Revolution and
China 's Tortuous Path to Democratizing Lenin, in REFORM AND REACTION IN
POST-MAO CHINA: THE ROAD TO TIANANMEN 162-82 (Richard Baum ed., 1991).
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blindness to this dimension of the Tiananmen tragedy stems from our
having grown accustomed to hearing our own intellectuals denigrate
the idea of the rule of law as a conservative defense of oppressive
power systems.
79
The tragedy in China resulted (in no small part), from the
failure of the student-leaders of the demonstrations to persuade the
octogenarians, who then ruled China, that the students were a force
for constructive political change rather than an attempt at the radical
overthrow of the government. This failure arose from two related
reasons. First, the students' message was both tailored for Western
audiences and, even when directed solely at Chinese audiences, the
message reflected predominantly Western values, in particular an
appeal to the rule of law. The students' appeals were so attractive to
us precisely because they spoke in terms familiar to us as the
language of democracy and the rule of law; indeed, often their press
releases and their press conferences actually were in English. Yet to
the octogenarians, the student discourse evoked memories of the
chaotic disorders of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.S°
Foreign commentators have also not considered how, if at all, Mikhail Gorbachev's
training as a lawyer affected his acts leading to the demise of the Soviet state. See,
e.g., Theodore Draper, Who Killed Soviet Communism?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, June
11, 1992, at 7. Gorbachev himself consistently and persistently insisted on his
reforms taking "constitutional" (i.e., legal) forms to the point of paralyzing his
opportunities to control the deteriorating situation. See, e.g., MIKHAIL GORBACHEV,
THE AUGUST COUP: THE TRUTH AND THE LESSONS 121 (1991). For a direct
comparison of the Soviet and Chinese legal approaches to dissent during the period
1985-1991, See, e.g., Zach Georgopoulos, Soviet and Chinese Criminal Dissent
Laws: Glasnost v. Tiananmen, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 475 (1991).
79 On the other hand, observers of German unification have noted the strong link
between democracy and the rule of law. Willem de Haan, Jos Silvis, & Philip A.
Thomas, Democracy, Rule of Law and Critical Legal Theory in Germany, 18 J.L.
& Soc'Y 347 (1991); Ulrich K. Preuss, Perspectives of Democracy and the Rule of
Law, 18 J.L. &SOC'Y 353 (1991).
80 See, e.g., Beijing Municipal Party Committee, Recognize the Essence of Turmoil
and the Necessity of Martial Law, in BEIJING SPRING, 1989: THE BASIC
DOCUMENTS 342-53 (Michael Oksenberg, Lawrence Sullivan, & Marc Lambert
eds., 1990).
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Second, the students implicitly argued that young intellectuals were
now the appropriate vanguard of social and political change, ready to
replace the group that had taken power forty years earlier.
The men who control China had no experience with either
democracy or the rule of law, but their personal memories resonated
powerfully to the image of millions of hostile demonstrators milling
around in Tiananmen Square.8'
Each of the ruling octogenarians had suffered personally at
the hands of another mass of students who made up the Red Guards
a little more than twenty years before the 1989 demonstrations. Deng
Xiaoping himself was purged twice during the Cultural Revolution,
as a result of which he served several years in prison, undergoing
incessant "struggle sessions" at the hands of the Red Guards before
he was allowed to return to his native Sichuan (Szechuan) province
to work as a waiter in a simple restaurant. His oldest son (Deng
Pufong) was pushed from a fourth-story window during an
interrogation by the Red Guards and to this day is confined to a
wheelchair. All the ruling octogenarians and most other high officials
in the Chinese government in 1989 could tell similar stories.
China's rulers simply had no positive experience with
Western democratic values. Those like Deng, who had studied
abroad in the early years of the century, had been treated as despised
representatives of "inferior" cultures. Those students were attracted,
quite naturally, not to the professed democracy of the metropolitan
culture but to the Marxist vision of class-based dictatorship of the
oppressed underclasses. Younger government officials often had no
first-hand experience of life abroad. For example, Li Peng, the
81 Perhaps the best study of the experience of the "Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution" is found in ANNE THURSTON, ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE: THE ORDEAL
OFTHEINTEI.EcTUALS IN CHINA'S GREAT CULTURALREVOLUTION (1988). See also
BRADY, supra note 30, at 192-99; NIEN CHENG, LIFE AND DEATH IN SHANGHAI
(1986); LENG & CHIU, supra note 36, at 16-18; GEREMIE BARME & JOHN MINFORD,
SEEDS OF FIRE: CHINESE VOICES OF CONSCIENCE (1989); YuE DAIYUN & CAROLYN
WAKEMAN, To THE STORM: THE ODYSSEY OF A REVOLUTIONARY CHINESE WOMAN
(1985).
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Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Premier) since 1988, was
noteworthy as one of the few high government officials who, as a
foster son of the Premier Zhou Enlai, was sheltered from harm
throughout the Cultural Revolution, but he had never been outside of
China except for a few years of study in Stalin's Russia.
Nor did anything in traditional Chinese culture prepare these
men to understand the principles undergirding the students' demands.
The Chinese historically had never experienced anything
approximating either Western democracy or a society governed by the
rule of law; nor has China ever been a "legal" culture. The 1978
decision made by China's rulers to "legalize" Chinese culture sought
to impose rule by law rather the rule of law.
Ironically, the rulers of China thereby inadvertently created
the very conditions under which the Tiananmen demonstrations were
likely to occur. Western experts imported to teach Western
technology brought with them Western ideas. The creation of
individual incentives to foster individual initiative in the economic
sphere served to create an atmosphere in which individual Chinese
felt encouraged to view their own ideas and ultimately their own
worth seriously.
Finally, the rhetoric of rule by law contained within itself the
seeds of a rhetoric of the rule of law -- i.e., demands that the state
(and the Party) follow its own professed rules.8 2 Once the rhetorical
space for these demands had been created, it became possible for
Chinese citizens to see themselves in political rather than in purely
economic terms relative to the ongoing reforms.
While the rhetoric of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations
was fundamentally different from the rhetoric of the students during
the Cultural Revolution, it had resonances that the octogenarians
heard as a return to those dark days. Deng and his cohorts were
simply too old to risk riding out the storm and returning to power
82 See, e.g., Li Buyun, Certain Questions Concerning the Relationship between
Party Policy and State Laws, 3 FAXUE JIKAN 3 (1984)(in Chinese).
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once again (as Deng had done twice before).83 The octogenarians
responded to this crisis as they wish they could have done in 1966 but
were unable to do because of the control of the military by Mao's
then ally, Lin Biao -- the octogenarians sent in the tanks to crush the
students and their allies.
Ironically, given the slogans embraced by the students and
their less educated supporters, the government found itself in the
anomalous position of having to fall back on the anti-government and
de-stabilizing slogans of the Cultural Revolution in the name of
stability and governmental legitimacy 4 and ignoring its own laws in
prosecuting those accused of stirring up trouble against the state.85
Only recently has the government reverted to emphasizing legal form
and economic reform.
83 See generally Fox Butterfield, Hard Line: Deng Returns with a Chilling Lesson
about Power in China, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1989, at 1.
84 See, e.g., Deng Xiao Ping, We Faced a "Rebellious Clique" and "Dregs of
Society," N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1989, at A6 (Deng's June 9 speech to military
commanders); and Li Peng, Report on the Outline of the Ten-Year Programme and
of the Eighth Five- Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development,
FOREIGN BROADCASTINF. SERV.--CHINA, no. 91-115, at 13-17, June 14, 1991. See
also KEITH, supra note I, at 208-25; Conner, supra note 54, at 31-43; and Georgo-
Volous, supra note 78, at 492-94.
5 See ASIA WATCH COMM., PUNISHMENT SEASON: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA
AFTER MARTIAL LAW (1990); INT'L LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RTS., HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CHINA: THE REPRESSION CONTINUES (1990); KEITH, supra note 1, at 143-80; Asia
Watch, The Case of Wang Juntao, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 151 (1991); Beijing
Abuses Legal Rights to Arrest "Rebels", FOREIGN BROADCAST INF. SERV.--CHINA,
no. 89-1 17, June 20, 1989, at 27; Nicholas D. Kristoff, 3 Chinese Workers
Sentenced to Die, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1989, at Al; Robin Munro, Rough Justice
in Beijing: Punishing the "Black Hands" of Tiananmen (sic) Square, 10 UCLA
PAC. BASIN L.J. 77 (1991); Robin Munro, The Beijing Trials: Secret Judicial
Proceedings and the Exclusion of Foreign Observers, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J.
136 (1991); and Supreme Court Issues Circular on Speedy Trials, FOREIGN
BROADCAST INF. SERV.--CHINA, no. 89-120, June 21, 1989, at 15. See generally
Mark Findlay, Show Trials in China: After Tiananmen Square, 16 J.L. & SOc'Y 352
(1989); Georgopolous, supra note 78, at 494-500; Jeffrey McCredie, Human Rights
Conce71s in the P.R.C.: An Appraisal of Recent Events, 3 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.
J. 217 (1990); Morris, supra note 2, at 1383-90.
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If this analysis of the Westernizing policies on the rhetoric of
Tiananmen Square is accurate, there is some reason for optimism
about the future of democracy and the rule of law in China. The
reforms that gave birth to the student movement are still largely intact
and are likely to remain so, absent an even more dramatic shift to the
old-style left at the top of the Chinese government. Educated young
people and junior cadres in the Party and the government appear
sympathetic to both democracy and the rule of law. As with the rise
to power in 1978 of the generation disillusioned by the Cultural
Revolution, when the individuals who supported the demonstrations
in 1989 rise into positions of real power one can hope that the values
expressed in those demonstrations will become the dominant rhetoric
of the government and the ruling party. Whether such a rhetorical
transition will result in actual policy changes, however, remains an
86open question.
We in the West have not done a good job in understanding
events in China or in communicating our concerns to China's leaders.
We must again consider carefully how to encourage positive change
in China. To do so, we must consider carefully whether the measures
we adopt and the rhetoric we employ will communicate more
effectively with those in power and with those to come to power.
This paper is not the place to analyze and debate specific policy
options in our dealings with Beijing.87 My purpose is both more
modest and more ambitious -- to lead us to realize the central
86 See also NATHAN, supra note 78, at 193-211. Note what happened in the former
U.S.S.R. when, for the first time since Lenin died, both the head of the government
(Nikolai Ryzhkov) and the head of the state and of the party (Mikhail Gorbachev)
were lawyers. See also supra note 78.
87 See, e.g., Ann Kent, China and the International Human Rights Regime: A
Case Study of Multilateral Monitoring, 1989-1994, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (1995);
Morris, supra note 2, at 1396-1411; Robbyn Reichman-Coad, Human Rights
Violations in China: A United States Response, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L. & COMP.
L. 163 (1994); Daniel C. Turack, China 's Iunan Rights Record Since Tiananmnen
(sic) 1989 and the Mixed Response of the United States, 23 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
507 (1993); W. Gary Vause, Tibet to Tiananmen: Chinese Human Rights and the
United States Foreign Policy, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1575 (1989).
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importance that the idea of law must play in our future relations,
formal and informal, with China.
